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エジプトではムバーラク大統領の国内政策と域内におけるエジプトの影響力低迷が
引き金となって、2011 年 1 月 25日に抗議運動起こった。抗議運動はエジプト全土に
拡がり、18 日間の民衆的な反体制運動によってムバーラクは軍に見捨てられ、失脚に
追い込まれた。この民衆蜂起によって警察は街頭から撤退し、シナイ半島の警察署は
焼き放たれ、ムバーラクが率いていた国民民主党の建物や国内治安機関の本部は襲
撃され、国家機関が数ヶ月にもわたって機能不全となり、ムバーラク体制の崩壊は国
内的な混乱を招くこととなった。振り返れば、エジプトでの政治的大変動は社会的な革
命へと展開することはできなかった。その理由は独裁体制からの移行を先導できる組
織化された反体制勢力が存在しなかったためである。民衆による抗議運動は一時的に
体制を転覆できても旧体制のエリートを分裂させることはできず、軍の影響下にある体
制の復活を防ぐこともできなかった。 
2011 年以降のエジプトは現在まで混乱状態に陥ったままであるが、1 カ月に及ぶ
エジプト軍最高評議会(SCAF)の暫定統治、エジプト史上初の自由な大統領選挙に
よって選出された文民大統領のムルスィーによる一年余りの統治、そして 2013年 7月
の軍事クーデターによって権力の座に就いたスィースィーの統治といった過程で、民
衆蜂起がエジプトの外交関係に及ぼした影響はごく僅かであった。本稿は、現在のエ
ジプトの外交政策が 2011 年の革命にほとんど影響を受けていないのはなぜか、また
エジプトの統治者たちが政権の正統性、体制の強化および政治的な安定性を確保
し、国内的な課題に対処するための戦略をいかに策定しているのかを説明することを
試みる。本稿での主張は、ムバーラク以降のエジプトが体制の強化と保全のために外
交政策を進めており、国内的な混乱によって地域内アクターへの依存度が高まってい
ることである。 
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Introduction 
On 25 January 2011, mass protests erupted, fuelled by grievances over President 
Hosni Mubarak’s domestic policies and Egypt’s declining role in regional politics. 
Eighteen days of nationwide, united anti-regime opposition compelled the military to 
abandon Mubarak. His overthrow ushered in revolutionary upheaval as the popular 
uprising shattered state institutions when the despised police withdrew from the streets, 
with their stations in Sinai burned to the ground, and the buildings of Mubarak’s 
National Democratic Party and the headquarters of the State Security Investigation 
agency and Interior Ministry were stormed and set ablaze.1 In retrospect, the upheaval 
was unable to advance towards political or social revolution. There was no organized 
opposition force to lead a transition from authoritarian rule. The popular protests also 
did not cause splits among the old elites or prevent the military backed rule from re-
reasserting itself. 
Thus the uprising had little impact on Egypt’s foreign relations under the 18-
month interim rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the year-long 
administration of the first democratically elected civilian president Muhammad Morsi, 
and now under Abdul Fattah al-Sisi who came to power through a military coup in July 
2013. This paper aims to explain why Egypt’s 2011 revolution had little impact on its 
foreign policy and how domestic actors formulated external strategies expected to ensure 
regime legitimacy, regime consolidation, political stability, and face domestic challenges. 
The paper argues that post-Mubarak Egypt increasingly pursued foreign policy for 
regime security and consolidation and that Egypt’s dependence on regional actors 
dramatically increased due to its internal turmoil. 
 
Egypt’s Evolving Foreign Policy 
The principal objective of a state’s foreign policy is to protect the sovereignty and 
national security of the state and maximize its vital regional and international 
interests.2 As such, foreign policy should primarily be concerned with two things, namely, 
the sources that could challenge national security, and the ways in which foreign policy 
can be used to protect national and international interests. In the case of Egypt, foreign 
policy had to follow certain dictates because of historical and geostrategic 
considerations.3 For instance, Egypt heavily depends on the Nile River which originates 
outside its borders and forms the basis of its agricultural sector. The Nile flows from 
south to north but the winds blow from north to south enabling sailing in the other 
                                                     
1 Salwa Ismail. 2012. “The Egyptian Revolution Against the Police,” Social Research 79 (2): 
435-462. 
2  Brian C. Schmidt. 2012. “The Primacy of National Security,” in Steve Smith, Amelia 
Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds.), Foreign Policy, Theories, Actors, Cases, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
3 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal. July 1978. “Egyptian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 56 (4). 
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direction so that the Nile unites Egypt, as it were.4 To protect the flow of the Nile, 
Egypt’s foreign policy has had to take into account a major geographic challenge that 
extends beyond its narrow Nile corridor. Hence, Egypt must crucially keep leverage over 
its southern border in order to maintain its supplies of water. 5  The other major 
geostrategic consideration stems from the Levant and the Sinai Peninsula which was 
long the overland route of foreign invasion. Just as all imperial powers had to control the 
Levant to maintain their power in Egypt, so Egyptian policymakers regard the Levant 
as vital to Egypt’s sovereignty and regional interests. When Muhammad Ali Pasha ruled 
over a strong Egypt (from 1805 to 1848), his army reached the modern border of Turkey, 
seized control of Northern Sudan, and created a strong sphere of influence over the 
Levant and Egypt’s southern border. 6  This kind of geostrategic calculation partly 
accounted for Egypt’s engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict even under monarchical 
rule. 
      
1. Egypt under Nasser (1953-1970) 
Historically, Egypt took a radical turn in its foreign policy when King Farouk I, 
who reigned from 1936, was overthrown by a military coup in 1952, an event that 
completed a process of independence from Great Britain. That anti-monarchical coup 
was one result of the defeat of the Egyptian and Arab armies in the Arab-Israeli War in 
1948. 7 Since then, anti-imperialism, opposition towards-Israel, pan-Arabism and the 
issue of Palestine have stayed at the top of Egypt’s foreign policy agenda. 
Under Gamal Abdul Nasser’s rule (1954-1970), Egypt, the Arab world’s biggest 
country was also its most influential. In the Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser based 
Egypt’s foreign policy upon three circles, namely the Arab, Islamic and the African. 
Under his rule, Egypt was free of foreign domination.8 The East and West competed 
against each other to arm Egypt’s military and build its industry. Egypt’s power 
expanded into the Levant (culminating with the formation of the United Arab Republic 
between Syria and Egypt 1958-1961) and Africa (Egypt’s support for liberation 
                                                     
4 Fekri A. Hassan. June 1997. “The Dynamics of a Riverine Civilization: A Geoarchaeological 
Perspective on the Nile Valley, Egypt,” World Archaeology 29 (1): Reverine Archaelogy: 51-74. 
5  Bonaya Adhi Godana. 1985. Africa’s Shared Water Resources: Legal and Institutional 
Aspects of the Nile, Niger, and Senegal River Systems, London: France Printer; Hamdy A. 
Hassan and Ahmad al-Rasheedy. 2007. “The Nile River and Egyptian Foreign Policy 
Interests,” African Sociological Review, 11 (1): 25-37. 
6  Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot. 1984. Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali, New York: 
Cambridge University Press; Latifa Mohamed Salem. 27 Oct.- 2 Nov. 2005. “Levantine 
Experiences,” Ahram Weekly: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/766/sc1.htm; Henry Dodwell. 
1967. The Founder of Modern Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
7 Said K. Aburish. 2004. Nasser: The Last Arab, New York: St. Martin’s Press; Eugene L. 
Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds). 2001. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, NY: 
Cambridge University Press:170. 
8 Gamal Abdel-Nasser. 1954. The Philosophy of the Revolution, Cairo: Information Dept., 
U.A.R. 
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movements through trade and political treaties) further than anytime since Muhammad 
Ali.  
But Nasser also actively used foreign policy to bolster his legitimacy, divert 
attention from domestic problems and contain his political opponents, mainly the 
Islamist movement. The Nasserist linkage of domestic and international politics was 
perhaps characteristic of governments which equated their survival with national 
security 9  and thereby ‘securitized’ the challenge of internal opposition, mainly the 
Muslim Brotherhood, that typically contained the most salient threat to regime 
survival.10  
Nasser’s policy of pan-Arab Nationalism brought Egypt a dominant role in Arab 
politics and gained his regime a high level of popular support across the region. He 
rallied Egyptians behind his anti-imperialist policies and defended Egypt’s sovereignty 
by playing a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement after the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, and nationalizing the Suez Canal in 1956 that led to military confrontation 
with European powers and Israel. With heightened legitimacy and popularity, he led the 
Arab world and the developing world and actively supported Arab states in their wars 
against Israel and in their struggle for independence.  
The contest between Nasser’s Egypt (Arab republics) and Saudi Arabia (Western 
backed Arab monarchies) revolved around the survival of various regimes.11 Nasser 
actively tried to export socialism and Arab nationalism to the Arab world. In this 
connection, in 1962 Nasser sent the Egyptian army into Yemen to help Yemeni army 
officers stage a coup against their monarchy and establish an Egyptian-style republic.12 
Nasser’s suspicion of the intentions of Western governments in the Arab world, and his 
rivalry with Saudi Arabia, Egypt’s main adversary, led him to craft an aggressive foreign 
policy that championed Palestinian rights and advocated the destruction of Israel. Being 
the most powerful and influential Arab leader and needing to advance Egypt’s role as 
the leader of the Arab world led Nasser to confront Israel militarily. On June 5, 1967, 
however, Israel attacked Egypt and destroyed most of its air force. From this ‘Six-Day 
War’, or al-Naksa, the catastrophe, as the Arabs called it, Israel seized the Sinai 
Peninsula. That defeat marked the beginning of the decline of Nasser’s Arab socialist 
regime in Egypt, and of Egypt’s influence in the Arab world and beyond. The 1967 War 
exposed the shortcomings of Nasser’s foreign policy. His military intervention in Yemen 
cost Egypt heavily and overstretched his army while his reliance on Soviet intelligence 
                                                     
9 Raymond Hinnebusch & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds). 2014. The Foreign Policy of Middle 
East States, Lynne Rienner. 
10 Mohammed Zahid. 2010. The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis, London: 
Tauris Academic Studies: 77. 
11 Joseph Mann. 2012. “King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser's Revolutionary Ideology,” 
Middle Eastern Studies, 48 (5): 749-764. 
12 Abd al-Aziz al-Muqalih. 1986. Abdel Nasser and Yemen: Chapters from the History of the 
Yemeni Revolution (in Arabic), Dar al-Hadatha. 
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to deter an Israeli attack proved to be disastrous.13 Indeed, Nasser’s failure paved the 
way for an eventual pro-Western reorientation of Egypt’s foreign policy.  
To counter Nasserism in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia advanced a pan-Islamic 
foreign policy.14 Among others, Saudi Arabia provided refuge and patronage to many 
members of the Nasser-persecuted Muslim Brotherhood and used them to denounce and 
delegitimize Nasser’s hegemony and secularism.15 After the mid 1950s, the oil boom in 
Saudi Arabia spurred modernization that was a boon for Egyptian educators among 
whom were a sizable number of Muslim Brothers. As Gilles Kepels rightly notes, the 
Brotherhood “played an influential role at the University of Medina, completed in 1961, 
where the doctrine of the Brothers was taught to students from all over the Muslim 
world.”16 The alliance with the Brotherhood enhanced Saudi Arabia’s Islamic legitimacy 
and bought greater influence over Arab politics. Later the Saudi-Brotherhood relations 
helped Nasser’s successor, Sadat, to defeat the Nasserists in Egypt and effectively 
eliminate the Saudi’s strongest Arab opponent.17 
    
2. Foreign Policy since Sadat 
When he succeeded Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat lacked the latter’s popular 
legitimacy while his new regime found it increasingly difficult to retain the welfare 
commitments of Nasserist socialism. Indeed, to consolidate his own position, Sadat 
engineered the “Corrective Revolution” of 1971 by which he purged powerful Nasserist 
figures from state institutions, including the ruling Arab Socialist Union and the army. 
He enhanced his legitimacy at home by allying with the Arab oil states and waging war 
against Israel in October 1973.18 One truly far-reaching result of that war was US 
diplomatic intervention that resolved Egypt’s conflict with Israel. When Sadat accepted 
peace with Israel, his chief concerns were to recover the Egyptian territories occupied by 
Israel and obtain American financing for development.19 The 1979 Camp David peace 
treaty, which Egypt signed with Israel, brought direct US aid and IMF loans to arrest 
Egypt’s economic deterioration. By the resulting USA-Israel-Egypt alliance, however, 
                                                     
13 Jesse Ferris. 2013. Nasser’s gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War 
and the Decline of Egyptian Power, Princeton University Press. 
14 Noor Ahmad Baba. 1992. “Nasser's Pan-Arab Radicalism and the Saudi Drive for Islamic 
Solidarity; a Response for Security,” India Quarterly, 48 (1/2):1-22. 
15 Nadav Safran. 1988. Saudi Arabia: the Ceaseless Quest for Security, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press. 
16 Gilles Kepel. 2005. Jihad: the Trial of Political Islam, translated by Anthony F. Roberts, 
London : I.B. Tauris: 51. 
17  Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Spring 1982. “An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim 
Brotherhood and Sadat,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 4 (1/2): 75-93. 
18 Paul Rivlin. 1981. The Liberalization of the Egyptian Economy: An Examination of the 
Decision-making Process, Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 
University. 
19  Ibrahim Karawan. May 1994. “Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26 (2): 249-266. 
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economic aid for Egypt was not only conditional on peace with Israel but also economic 
privatization, essentially selling off public assets.20 
For the USA, Arab-Israeli peace would, among others, minimize Soviet influence 
in the Middle East. As early as in July 1972, in fact, Sadat had expelled almost all of 
20,000 Soviet military advisors in Egypt (although a year later Saudi Arabia granted 
Egypt $500 million for purchasing Soviet weapons).21 As part of the alliance with the 
USA, Sadat terminated ties with the Soviet Union and actively opposed Soviet influence 
in the Middle East during the remaining Cold War period. Egypt’s alliance with the USA 
strengthened after the fall of the anti-communist and pro-Western Shah of Iran, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979.  
The alliance with the USA was Egypt’s bridge to the international system and its 
main route of access to external resources. However, although Sadat placed economic 
survival ahead of nationalist ambitions in foreign policy, his formula of linking peace 
with prosperity failed to produce the latter. Civilian and military aid from the USA came 
with an open-door economic strategy of dismantling Nasser’s state welfare and 
developmental policies in favor or privatization and the sale of public assets.22 That 
economic strategy did not improve economic conditions for the majority of Egyptians. 
Instead, it burdened Egypt with high levels of debt, a widening income/wealth gap 
between rich and poor and the virtual elimination of its industrialization.  
In terms of foreign policy, rapprochement with Israel and the USA left Egypt 
with little room to maneuver regionally and internationally. Egypt had to act as a force 
for stability against anti-Western radicalism and rally the Arabs to accept Israel. 23 
Consequently, Egypt was isolated and boycotted by many Arab and Muslim states by the 
time Mubarak assumed power following Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Therefore, 
Mubarak’s first foreign policy challenge was to bring Egypt back to the Arab fold and 
restore relations with the major regional players. He balanced residual Nasserist 
nationalist policies and Sadat’s close leanings to USA and Israel, recovering nationalist 
legitimacy without discarding Sadat’s foreign policy.24 By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Egypt had restored full relations with Arab countries and the Arab League headquarters 
was returned to Cairo in 1990.  
                                                     
20 Heba Handoussa and Nemat Shafiq. 1993. “The Economics of Peace: the Egyptian Case,” 
in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma (eds.), The Economic of Middle East Peace, 
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. 
21 Galia Golan. 1990. Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Yaacov Roi. 1975. The USSR and Egypt in the 
Wake of Sadat’s “July Decisions.” Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University. 
22 John Waterbury. 1983. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two 
Regimes, Princeton University Press. 
23 Banerji, A. K. January 1991. “Egypt under Mubarak: the Quest for Stability at Home and 
Normalization Abroad,” Round Table, 317: 7-20. 
24  Jason Brownlee. 2007. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge 
University Press: 124-126. 
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During the 1990s, by normalizing its relations with the Arab world and serving 
as the main peace broker between the Israelis and the Arabs, Egypt received 
dramatically increased aid. Further, Egypt’s reward for participating in the 1990-1991 
Gulf War against Iraq was the cancellation of substantial portions of Egypt’s debts to the 
IMF and the USA, its debts to Arab creditors and half of its debt to Paris Club 
members.25 Egypt’s support for the UN coalition against Iraq provided critical political 
cover for the US and might have lessened Arab and Muslim opposition to Western 
policies in the Middle East. Like Sadat, Mubarak wanted to make Egypt indispensable 
to US interests by promoting Egypt as a moderator and stabilizer of the Arab world. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of Islamophobia in the West after 9/11, 
Mubarak repositioned his regime as the defender of secularism in Egypt and the Arab 
world and a bulwark against “Islamist terrorism”, the new enemy of the USA. Mubarak 
launched his own, domestic “war on terror” by suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other forms of opposition in the name of national security upheld by emergency and 
military courts.26 Meanwhile, the USA eased its pressure for democratization in Egypt 
after its failure in Iraq, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s 2005 
parliamentary elections, and the victory of Hamas in the first democratic elections in the 
Palestinian territories in 2006. It became clear that the US would not risk further 
regional destabilization by abandoning Mubarak to an Islamist takeover.  
In the last years of Mubarak’s 30-year rule, when crisis began to surround the 
matter of the succession to Mubarak, Egyptian foreign policy became increasingly 
dependent on the West and the Arab Gulf states. Widening rapprochement between 
Israel and Arab States compelled Egypt to find a new role in regional affairs. Egypt 
became more deeply integrated into the US strategy in the Middle East and more closely 
aligned with the Arab Gulf States. Egypt only played a supporting diplomatic role in 
negotiations between Hamas and Fateh, and between Hamas and Israel. Its “war on 
terror” allowed Egypt to be part of the pro-Western camp, which included Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan, that was opposed to an anti-West camp that included Iran, Syria, Hezbollah 
and Hamas. In practice, for example, Egypt supported Israel’s wars against Hamas in 
Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Egyptian-Israeli relations peaked in December 2004 
when the two countries signed a $2.5 billion preliminary agreement on the sale of 
Egyptian natural gas to Israel and the establishment of qualified industrial zones (QIZs) 
with Israel and the USA.27 
The domestic political climate changed drastically, however, under the impact of 
regional events. The second Palestinian uprising in 2000 and the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003 brought the return of street politics when thousands of Egyptians occupied Tahrir 
                                                     
25  Galal Amin. 2011. Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011, The American 
University in Cairo Press: 58. 
26  Jason Brownlee. October 2004. Democratization in the Arab World? The Decline of 
Pluralism in Mubarak’s Egypt, Journal of Democracy, 13 (4): 6-14. 
27 Vikash Yadav. March 2007. “The Political Economy of the Egyptian-Israeli QIZ Trade 
Agreement,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11 (1): 74-96. 
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Square, Cairo, for the first time in decades in 2003.28 These two crises, the failure of 
Egypt and other Arab governments to prevent the American invasion of Iraq, and the 
growing economic difficulties prompted renewed challenge to the Mubarak regime which 
started a long process of activism and street protests that led to Egypt’s “Revolution” on 
25 January 2011. 
Egypt’s deepening relations with Israel went hand in hand with the rise of a new 
ruling class centered on the Mubarak family and especially Mubarak’s son, Gamal. To 
the USA and Israel, as a matter of fact, Mubarak presented Gamal as the safest choice 
to preserve Egypt’s deeply unpopular peace with Israel. Earnestly promoted as the face 
of new Egypt, Gamal made frequent and highly publicized state visits to Washington 
during which he participated in negotiations and strategic meetings. The USA tacitly 
approved Mubarak’s succession ploy in May 2006 when Vice President Dick Cheney and 
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley met Gamal at the White House during the 
latter’s unofficial visit. 29 With US support and its strong leverage on the Egyptian 
military, Gamal himself sought support from the Egyptian military, the only institution 
that could guarantee a smooth and peaceful transition of power from father to son. In 
short, legitimizing the regime abroad became more important than legitimizing it at 
home.  
 
Egypt after Mubarak 
Two important aspects of the 2011 uprising and the political system maintained 
Egypt’s foreign policy after Mubarak’s ouster. First, the uprising was not about foreign 
policy but the Mubarak regime’s failed domestic policy. Second, Mubarak’s overthrow 
turned out to be little more than a change in the leadership of the regime as the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) replaced Mubarak by taking over the 
presidency.  
Even so, the uprising held potential implications for foreign policy. The intense 
anti-Mubarak demonstrations often featured chants and songs that mockingly called on 
Mubarak to seek refuge in Tel Aviv,30 evidence of popular anger that the regime did not 
serve Egypt’s national interests but those of USA and Israel. After Mubarak was 
overthrown, various opposition groups launched violent protests outside the Israeli, 
American, and Saudi embassies in Cairo.31 They demanded a more assertive foreign 
                                                     
28 Schemm Paul. March 2003. “Egypt Struggles to Control Anti-War Protests,” Middle East 
Report Online (MERIP) 31. 
29 Jason Brownlee. “The Heir Apparency of Gamal Mubarak,” Arab Studies Journal (Fall 
2007-Spring 2008): 36-56. 
30 Alhayat, ‘Slogans of the Egyptian Revolution,’ September 26, 2014:http://alhayat.com/Articles/ 
4769345/تاراعش-ةروثلا-ةيرصملا-اهتحارصب----اهايافخو 
31 ‘Egyptians attack Israel embassy, ambassador evacuated,’ Reuters, September 10, 2011; 
‘The storming of Cairo’s Israeli embassy: an eyewitness account,’ Ahramonline, September 10, 
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policy that would include the defense of Palestinians and Egyptian expatriates in the 
Gulf.32 On their part, Israel and Saudi Arabia tried to rally international support for 
Mubarak. For the first time Israel allowed Egyptian battalions to be deployed in the 
demilitarized Sinai33 while King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud denounced Egyptian 
protests as the work of “infiltrators” out to destabilize Egypt.34 The latter was not only 
concerned that the overthrow of Mubarak would motivate other Arabs to rise against 
their regimes. By supporting Mubarak, Saudi Arabia wanted to maintain its close 
alliance with Egypt and the USA to contain the rising Iranian influence in the region 
since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 unseated Saddam Hussein. The USA did not 
advocate Mubarak’s resignation; it only called for an “orderly transition” under the 
supervision of General Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s longtime intelligence chief and 
enforcer (whom Mubarak appointed vice president during the uprising) and Field 
Marshal Muhammad Husein Tantawi.35 In other words, the USA urged military-led 
“change”.   
But continuity rather than change characterized Egypt’s post-Mubarak foreign 
policy and international alliances. First, SCAF members who replaced Mubarak had for 
decades been the regime’s guardians against internal and external threats, and 
caretakers of USA-Egypt relations and peace with Israel. Their interests remained 
intact when SCAF ruled Egypt during the transitional period and after their July 2013 
coup against President Muhammad Morsi. Second, the forces that dominated the 
parliament and the presidency, that is, the non-revolutionary Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafists, maintained an alliance with the military.36 Third, the popular mobilization 
against the regime in 2011 had stopped short of dismantling state institutions and 
curbing the power of the military. In effect, the structure and distribution of power did 
not undergo significant change that might have altered the country’s foreign policy.  
 
3. Egyptian Foreign Policy under Muhammad Morsi (June 2012 - July 2013) 
                                                                                                                                                              
2011: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/20856/Egypt/The-storming-of-Cairos-
Israeli-embassy-an-eyewitne.aspx 
32 Khaled Elgindy, “Egypt, Israel, Palestine,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, American 
University in Cairo:http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid 
=221#; Heba Saleh. ‘Saudi Arabia closes Cairo embassy,’ Financial Times, April 29, 2012. 
33 “Israel allows Egypt troops in Sinai for first time since 1979 peace treaty,” Haaretz, January 
31, 2011: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-allows-egypt-troops-in-sinai-
for-first-time-since-1979-peace-treaty-1.340405 
34 Caryle Murphy. February 14, 2011, ‘Fall of Mubarak deprives Saudi Arabia of closest local 
ally,’ The National: http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/fall-of-mubarak-deprives-
saudi-arabia-of-closest-local-ally 
35 ‘Clinton Calls for ‘Orderly Transition’ in Egypt,’ New York Times, January 30, 2011: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/world/middleeast/31diplo.html?_r=0 
36 Ibrahim El-Houdaiby. June 2014. “Changing Alliances and Continuous Oppression: The 
Rule of Egypt's Security Sector,” Arab Reform Initiative: 1-29, available at: http://www.arab-
reform.net/sites/default/files/Houdaiby_-_Egypt_Security_Sector_-_June_2014.pdf 
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The ascent of President Muhammad Morsi (in office from June 2012 to July 
2013) tentatively marked a tripartite re-balancing of power – among the military (with 
its dominance over state institutions), the Muslim Brotherhood (with its well organized 
civil society institutions), and the broadly secular and liberal activists (with their ability 
to mobilize massive demonstrations). In spite of his Muslim Brotherhood affiliation, 
Morsi had not set out to impose an ideological reorientation on Egypt’s foreign policy. He 
did express a need for new relations with the international community based on mutual 
respect and interest. For Egypt he sought a less explicitly pro-American role in the 
region but he assured traditional allies that Egypt would abide by its international 
treaties, the most important of which was to preserve the 1979 peace deal with Israel.37  
There are four main reasons for Morsi’s unchanged foreign policy. First, Egypt’s 
foreign policy was motivated by its economic challenges and a dire need to attract 
foreign investments. In his inauguration speech, Morsi affirmed that Egypt had no 
intention to “export the revolution.”38 He assured the rulers of Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf countries that Egypt’s foreign policy recognized these states to be a crucial source of 
aid and investment and home to millions of Egyptian workers. Moreover, he gave 
assurances that his “Islamist” government would be moderate. By maintaining an active 
but unchanged foreign policy, Morsi wanted to compensate for the lack of a coherent 
vision for successful economic and social policies at home. Finally, the unrelenting and 
fierce opposition to Morsi’s government and the idea of rule by the Muslim Brotherhood 
forced Morsi to resort to Mubarak-like use of foreign policy to serve narrow domestic 
political interests and reliance on the military and the police to counterbalance the 
revolutionary forces. In short, Morsi followed the practice of previous regimes of gaining 
foreign recognition to bolster domestic support.  
In fact, domestic political concerns delayed Morsi’s formulation of clear foreign 
policy. Besides, his ability to have a more assertive foreign policy was restricted by the 
lack of financial resources and his inability to control the military and other state 
institutions. In the wake of 2011 uprising, Egypt’s foreign exchange reserves had been 
halved. With Egypt urgently requiring massive foreign financial aid, Morsi needed the 
USA and the IMF’s financial support to achieve the economic recovery he had promised 
his electorate. Here, perhaps the most important institutional factor in keeping foreign 
policy unchanged was the SCAF’s continuing control of state institutions, its ability to 
dictate the rules of domestic politics at home, and its concern to preserve its relationship 
with the USA and Israel in order to protect its interests and safeguard the flow of 
financial aid from the USA. 
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Yet, some of Morsi’s diplomatic gestures did not reassure his doubters. He 
became the first Egyptian president, since Sadat broke diplomatic relations with Iran in 
the 1980s, to visit Tehran when he attended the Non-Aligned Movement meetings in 
August 2012. There, Morsi called for the creation of a regional group consisting of 
Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to mediate an end to the Syrian conflict.39 In 
February 2013, President Ahmadinejad of Iran visited Egypt. A month later, the two 
countries had their first commercial flight in three decades. While Morsi attempted to 
mend Egypt’s relations with Iran, the latter saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential 
Sunni ally against the Saudis. Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ali Khamenei, had 
previously declared the uprising against Mubarak as an “Islamic Awakening” across the 
region. He called Mubarak’s overthrow a defeat for Western-backed governments and a 
victory for Islamists who were inspired by Iran’s Islamic revolution. But Egypt’s 
resumption of full diplomatic relations with Iran was hampered by Saudi aversion 
towards Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, and additionally blocked by Egypt’s security 
apparatus and the Salafists.40 It was made clear to Egypt that closer ties with Iran 
would jeopardies economic aid from the Gulf countries. The USA was itself alarmed in 
another way. The USA was already unhappy with expanding Egypt-China trade 
relations, marked by Morsi’s early diplomatic visit to China and his attempt to join the 
BRICS groupings.41 Now the USA feared that the rapprochement with Iran presaged a 
long-term shift in Egypt’s foreign policy at a time of heightened tension between the 
USA and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program.  
If Morsi’s attempt to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia were met with 
Saudi distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood, his efforts to improve ties with Qatar – a 
rival of the Saudis – were more successful because of Qatar’s preference for the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Qatar poured $8 billion of financial support into Egypt during Morsi’s 
government, gave Egypt a favorable gas deal to alleviate power shortages and prepared 
plans to invest $18 billion in Egypt over five years.42 Moreover, the Qatari television 
channel Al Jazeera crucially supported Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. By using the 
Egyptian Islamists, Qatar aimed to promote its interests, bolster the emirate’s domestic 
and regional legitimacy and protect itself from Saudi Arabia. A long-standing rivalry 
with Saudi Arabia and its proximity to Iran compelled Qatar to embark on an 
independent foreign policy in order to manage its ties with various regional actors.43 
While enjoying unparalleled US military protection and internal stability, Qatar wanted 
to influence the “new” post-Arab Spring Middle East and obtain security and 
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independence from the Saudis44 for whom the Brotherhood’s Islamist model combined 
the passion of religion with the power of the ballot box; there was also the threat to 
posed by the potential Brotherhood appeal to the Saudi population and in the region.45 
In addition, Qatar’s aid to the Muslim Brotherhood was believed to have resonated 
favorably across much of the Middle East and perhaps permitted Qatar a role in 
emerging popular revolts.46 It was apparently a principal objective of Qatari foreign 
policy to be able to assume leading positions in mediating various regional problems and 
conflicts. 47  Qatar has aimed to represent itself as an independent and progressive 
regional and international actor that is valuable to the region and the world. 
Morsi also strengthened ties with Turkey’s pan-Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government which saw the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a 
potential strategic partner to advance Turkey’s influence in the Middle East. More than 
the rise of nationalism in any country or pan-Arab nationalism, the dominance of Islamic 
nationalism after the collapse of Arab authoritarian regimes would give Turkey much 
influence in a region united “under Islam”. Hence, Turkey supported the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine and other Islamist groups in Syria. Turkey’s 
President Abdullah Gul was the first statesman to visit Egypt after Morsi was elected 
president. The embrace of the Brotherhood by Qatar and Turkey implied their further 
cooperation on many regional issues and aid for Morsi’s government to build a regional 
camp independent of Saudi Arabia. With a privileged relationship with Turkey, Morsi 
would construct an alliance with democratic Islamists that could form a potential new 
regional order to counter the Saudi threat and its influence over the Egyptian Salafists 
such as al-Nour Party which drew support from wealthy Salafis in the Gulf and were the 
Brotherhood’s main political and ideological rival. Morsi and Erdogan could also use 
their common positions on the Syrian conflict and support for Hamas to strengthen their 
positions within their respective political movements and against their opponents.  
Morsi’s regional foreign policy initiatives were not enough to give him the upper 
hand over his domestic opponents in the streets and state institutions until he achieved 
a diplomatic success in brokering a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in November 
2012 that was highly praised by the Obama administrations and Tel Aviv. With that 
success in bringing stability to a volatile region, Morsi proved himself to be a pragmatist 
not an ideologue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed Israel’s Deputy Prime 
                                                     
44 “Behind Qatar’s bet on the Muslim Brotherhood,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 
2014; Rene Rieger. 2014. “In Search of Stability: Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring,” GRM 
Papers, Gulf Research Center: 1-21. 
45 “Saudi Arabia Pleased with Morsi’s Fall,” Almonitor, July 4, 2013. 
46  Lina Khatib. 2013. “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: the Limits of Pragmatism,” International 
Affairs 89 (2): 417-431. 
47  Such as between the Palestinian political factions, peace efforts in Sudan’s Darfur, 
attempts to facilitate talks between Afghanistan’s Taliban and the Afghani government, and 
the release of hostages by Islamist fighters in Syria in March 2014. 
 Regime Survival Strategies and the Conduct of Foreign Policy in Egypt 
   
55 
 
IDE ME Review Vol.2 
©IDE-JETRO 2015 
Minister Dan Meridor stated that the ceasefire had created a new bond between Israel 
and Egypt’s new government.48 
It was after emerging as a major regional player who had won the trust of the 
USA and Israel that Morsi countered domestic threats to his position. In November 2013, 
he granted himself sweeping powers by passing unilateral constitutional declarations 
that gave all presidential decisions immunity from legal challenges and judicial review. 
He also sacked the chief prosecutor, Abdel Maguid Mahmoud, a Mubarak holdover, and 
announced that there would be retrials of failed prosecutions of those suspected of 
ordering or committing violence against the protestors of 2011.49 Morsi’s move backfired. 
It alienated non-Islamist forces which continued their challenge through renewed street 
mobilization that would eventually be the military’s pretext for staging its coup. After 
the coup, Egypt’s Prosecutor-General accused Morsi and his top aides of espionage and 
sharing state secrets with Iran and of spying on Egypt for Hamas and Hezbollah.50 
 
4. Sisi’s Foreign Policy 
Sisi’s coup d’état came after massive anti-government demonstrations were held 
on June 30, the anniversary of Morsi’s presidential inauguration, and calls for early 
presidential elections. Sisi suspended the Constitution, installed an interim government 
and appointed Adly Mansour, the head of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, as the 
interim President (for the duration of 3 July 2013 to 8 June 2014). On June 8, 2014, Sisi 
became president following a landslide election victory.  
Apart from everything else, the 2013 coup restored “Mubarakism” in Egypt’s 
foreign policy, especially with a dramatic improvement in relations with Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and a drastic deterioration in ties with Qatar. This 
diplomatic development was accompanied by Egypt’s deepening economic dependence on 
Saudi Arabia and UAE. Whereas previous Egyptian regimes were able to maintain a 
stance of equality vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, Sisi’s regime now worked in the regional orbit 
of the Saudis who had become more assertive as regional states became somewhat wary 
of US capacity and unpredictability in the wake of the latter’s response to the events of 
the Arab Spring.51 
Sisi’s dependence on Saudi Arabia and UAE has prevented any reconciliation 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. The military has resumed its “war on terror”, seeking to 
combat Islamism at home – by eradicating the Muslim Brotherhood by force – and 
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abroad. Sisi’s reliance on Saudi also prevents Egypt from having an independent foreign 
policy that could contradict the Saudi’s regional agenda. For instance, Sisi’s regime 
adopts anti-Hamas policies that purportedly link Hamas to Egypt’s insecurity and 
instability. Furthermore, Egypt sought more help from the USA and Israel by 
demonstrating its subaltern usefulness in destroying the Sinai-Gaza tunnels and 
enforcing Gaza’s wider isolation. During the last war between Hamas and Israeli in 
August 2014, the Egyptian government prolonged the conflict in Gaza by using the talks 
as part of its war against the Muslim Brotherhood.52 Sisi’s government views Hamas to 
be identical to the enemy they are fighting at home. Previous regimes had linked Egypt’s 
national security interests to mediating between Hamas and Israel. Sisi’s policy towards 
Gaza has entangled his domestic and international agenda in regional alignments with 
Saudi Arabia and UAE who view Hamas as an offshoot of the Brotherhood that 
threatens not only Israel, but them. Steven Cook noted that “given the intense anti-
Muslim Brotherhood and anti-Hamas propaganda to which Egyptians have been 
subjected and upon which Sisi’s legitimacy in part rests, the violence in Gaza serves both 
his political interests and his overall goals.”53 
Sisi hopes to use his strong alignment with the Arab Gulf states to pressure the 
USA and other Western powers to embrace his regime fully. On their part, the Arab Gulf 
states have invested heavily in Sisi’s regime and given Egypt large amounts of loans and 
subsidies and advocated the acceptance of Sisi’s government around the world. However, 
Egypt did not indulge in Saudi’s promotion of anti-Shia agenda in the region. Sisi’s main 
concern is stability more than confrontation with Iran. And Egypt has to prove to the 
USA that it can help to stabilize regional order rather than be involved in regional wars 
or become a proxy for regional players.  
Presently, Egypt offers security cooperation in the Middle East, being aware that 
its dependence on the Arab Gulf states cannot go on forever. The Gulf States have 
funded mega projects in Egypt but these would not necessarily set the economy right.54 
Aid from the Gulf is expected to sustain Egypt’s economy for months only. Together with 
other Gulf States Saudi Arabia sent a clear message that their aid to Egypt cannot go on 
forever.55 Egypt requires aid and loans from the international financial institutions such 
as World Bank and IMF and realizes that it can receive such only with US support.56 
But the regime’s overall approach to the economy is mired in deep problems. 
Egypt has a statist economy with little encouragement of the private sector that could 
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create jobs for its large number of unemployed youth.57 Sisi has long military experience 
but not an economic strategy to generate large-scale employment. Without an overhaul 
of economic conditions, how would Sisi be able to control Egypt to the point of excluding 
normal political life? 
 
Domestic Strategy 
As a matter of fact, Sisi’s foreign policy of regime consolidation goes together with 
the outright repression of domestic opposition, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, while 
the armed forces are repositioned as guardians preventing internal and external actors 
from ‘working to undermine the Egyptian state.’ For its survival, the regime has to 
demonstrate that its main goal is to protect Egyptian borders and sovereignty. The 
securitization of domestic political discourse has been a tool for regime consolidation, 
largely helped by Egypt’s state and private media that enhanced the military’s message 
that Islamists are terrorists.58 Before its crackdown on Morsi’s supporters in August 
2013, Sisi called on Egyptians to take to the streets and public squares across the 
country to authorize the army to “confront violence and terrorism.” By mid-September 
2013 the Sisi regime had banned the Muslim Brotherhood, taken over its schools, clinics 
and social welfare institutions. In December the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a 
terrorist group.59 
Since September 2013, the Jihadist group, Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, who had 
hitherto operated against the military in Sinai or crossed the border into Israel, started 
to attack mostly police and military targets in Egypt.60 Yet the regime chose to blame 
those attacks on the Muslim Brotherhood. 61  Moreover, Sisi has portrayed the war 
against the militant Jihadists as a fight against an internal and external conspiracy to 
divide and draw Egypt into civil war.62 The regime has used such reasoning to silence 
critics and force them to barter political freedom for stability and security. It has sought 
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to quash fears and conceal the defections of a number of military officers to radical 
groups. Some Egyptian media have reported that the October 24, 2014 attacks against 
military checkpoints in Sinai, which killed 31 Egyptian soldiers, were planned and 
executed by two former army officers, Emad Abdel al-Halim and Hesham Ashmawy.63 In 
fact, most Egyptians do not know or understand the war against the Jihadists in Sinai, 
but the military insists that the militants are an extension of former Brotherhood 
members. For that matter, the military is not preoccupied with winning the war but 
using conflicts to create perceptions of instability, lower mass socioeconomic expectations, 
maintain external support, curb internal opposition, and justify the securitization of 
society. This strategy was already evident in Sisi’s own electoral campaign. He did not 
promise anything better, only talked about how bad things were in Egypt. He said that 
the state had little to offer to Egyptians but asked them instead to work harder and 
contribute to the country as its situation was dire on many fronts. 
Constantly using his slogan, “Egypt will not fall”, Sisi warned Egyptians of the 
fate of neighboring countries that fell to civil wars.64 The broader regional context that 
was scarred by sectarian and civil conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya lent a 
semblance of legitimacy to such discourse. As such, the regime is emboldened to rule 
with coercion with little intention to be accommodating towards the opposition. 
Moreover, the Brotherhood’s continued refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Sisi 
and its ability to mobilize supporters onto the streets justify the latter’s constant 
repression of the Brotherhood and opposition at large. While targeting the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the regime has repressed secular opposition as well with the systematic 
suppression of protests, arrests of the icons of the 2011 revolution, massive rights abuses, 
and mass killing. The government instituted a new Protest Law which severely curbs 
protest.65 Had such a law been in force under Morsi, the mass protests against his 
government up to the 2013 coup would have been illegal. 
The reinforcement of a state of fear with nationalist discourse has allowed the 
regime to take the bold decisions of cutting energy and food subsidies which previous 
presidents did not dare to adopt. Getting Egyptians to endure their present suffering 
with patience has been facilitated by what Emad Shahin calls “neoliberal militarism” 
which assigns stronger military intervention in economic decision-making and 
management.66 Here, what distinguishes Sisi’s regime from Mubarak’s is the increasing 
allocation of economic projects to the military and presence of military generals in 
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ministries with oversight authority over other ministries. Consequently, non-military 
state institutions lapse into steady decay vis-à-vis the military. The Egyptian 
constitution enshrines the supremacy of the military by placing it beyond the control of 
the executive branch or the “civilian presidency.” One cannot but recall Egypt under 
Nasser of military rule. The critical difference is, the present state is inherently based on 
neoliberal capitalism and “repressive-exclusionary modes of governance”67 without the 
Nasserist aim to restructure the economic system for social mobility or re-distribution.  
Another important internal element of regime consolidation is Sisi’s exaggerated 
nationalist rhetoric regarding Egypt’s recent history and role in the Arab world. To some 
extent, Sisi has evinced anti-Western tones with explicit anti-Islamist overtones, 
resorting to Nasser’s key messages of nationalism, skepticism of western intentions, 
Arab dignity, and strong leadership as being essential to saving Egypt from the chaos of 
the 2011 revolution. Sometimes the Egyptian regime and media would even accuse the 
USA of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood to erode Egypt’s stability.68 Undermining 
the Muslim Brotherhood in this manner the regime has tried to garner support for 
reinstituting personalized military rule.  
 
External Strategy 
Like Morsi, Sisi adopted an active foreign policy driven by domestic opposition to 
his rule. Sisi has realigned Egypt with the stable Arab monarchies that face similar 
challenges from the Arab Spring and political Islam represented by an ascendant 
Muslim Brotherhood. In particular, Sisi’s regime needed a strong alliance with Saudi 
Arabia, UAE and Kuwait to counteract the Muslim Brotherhood’s regional supporters. 
The Egypt-Saudi alignment exerts pressure and threatens isolation on Turkey, Qatar 
and Hamas (a non-state actor seen by Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi to be an extension 
to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) 
Saudi Arabia’s significant support for Sisi has two objectives, namely, to 
establish Egypt as a bulwark against political Islam and the Brotherhood in particular, 
and to curtail Iranian influence which is considerable in Syria and Iraq, and Lebanon, 
countries that constitute Saudi Arabia’s “backyard” and in Yemen where Saudi Arabia 
believes that the recent Houthi expansion is backed by Iran. In this regard, Iranian 
support for Assad is the flip side of Saudi Arabian support for Sisi: each has the aim of 
creating a strong barrier to the inflow of external influence, including that of Turkey and 
Qatar. Since Egypt, the most populous country with the largest army in the Arab world, 
can serve as a strong Sunni deterrent against Iranian influence, the Saudis have 
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provided billions of dollars in financial aid to Sisi and financed arm deals between Cairo 
and Moscow. The Saudis believe that the Egyptian army can be deployed to protect 
Saudi borders from incursions by extremist groups and the potential for both countries 
to coordinate a joint military intervention in the Yemeni conflict. On many occasions, 
Sisi stressed that Gulf security was an integral part of Egypt’s own security and 
indicated his readiness to commit Egyptian troops to defend the Gulf and Arab 
security.69 
Given Qatar’s increasing rivalry with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, Sisi 
saw an opportunity to weaken and isolate Qatar. In protest at Qatar’s policies, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. 
Owing to Saudi pressure, some Egyptian Brotherhood leaders had to leave Doha in 
September 2014 while the Qatari al-Jazeera news networks shut down its Egypt Direct 
(Al-Jazeera Mubasher) TV channel in December 2014 after Qatar reached a 
reconciliation agreement with Saudi Arabia and UAE. Later, and in the presence of a 
Saudi official, Sisi met with a representative from the Qatari government for the first 
time since he became president.  
Turkey emerged as the fiercest international critic of the overthrow of Morsi 
which damaged its relations with Saudi Arabia.70 The relations between Turkey and 
Egypt deteriorated following the killing of hundreds of Morsi’s supporters in Cairo’s 
Rabaa al-Adawiya and Nahda squares in August 2013. Turkey recalled its ambassador 
from Cairo and the Turkish Prime Minister called for the United Nations Security 
Council to convene for an urgent response to what he described as a massacre.71 Turkey 
refused to recognize the government set up after the 2013 coup, insisting that Morsi 
remained the legitimate president. In November 2013, Egypt expelled the Turkish 
ambassador and downgraded ties with Turkey to the level of charge d'affaires.  
Erdogan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world has two 
important motives. First, Erdogan’s Islamist supporters continue to admire Morsi and 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.72 Second, Erdogan’s recent policies of depoliticizing 
the Turkish military to protect his rule from military coup, necessitates a strong stance 
against any military coup against an elected government.73 Turkey’s anti-coup foreign 
policy indicates that mending relations with Egypt will not be possible in the near future. 
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This has made Turkey home to Egyptian and mainly Brotherhood opposition which is 
assured of continued support from Turkey. 
Sisi has sought to neutralize Turkey’s threat with anti-Turkey alliances in the 
Middle East and beyond. He hosted a meeting in Cairo that was attended by the Cyprus 
leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and Greek Prime Minister Antonio Samaras. A new energy 
cooperation deal was announced between Egypt, Greece and Greek Cyprus. The deal 
challenges Turkey’s claim on gas deposits in areas of east Mediterranean that are 
claimed by Cyprus. And in a joint “Cairo Declaration”, the three countries called on 
Turkey to respect the “sovereignty of Cyprus over its exclusive economic zone.” 74 
Although Turkey joined the anti-Assad forces in Syria, Turkey’s support has been seen 
by Saudi Arabia and UAE as support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Through 
“losing” Egypt, Turkey has become rather isolated, suffering more difficult relations with 
Baghdad, Damascus, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and, of course Jerusalem, not to mention being 
at odds with Tehran over Syria and Iraq. 
Egypt made sure to draw closer to Israel whose own relations with Turkey have 
become more strained after Erdogan claimed that Israel was behind the military 
takeover in Egypt.75 Israeli recognition of the authority set up after Morsi’s ouster was a 
way to preempt the US from officially announcing that the military takeover was a coup, 
which would have terminated or disrupted US military aid to Egypt. Israel was a 
staunch defender of Sisi’s regime and opposed any reduction of aid from the US to Egypt. 
Likewise, Israel’s praise for the Egyptian security operations against Jihadists secured 
further acceptance of Sisi by the USA. In fact, Israel benefited from the activities of the 
Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai, which provided a buffer zone for Israeli border 
security. Hence, Israel allowed the Egyptian military to operate in zone (C) of Sinai, for 
the first time since 1967, although the peace treaty prohibits in principle any Egyptian 
military presence in the area. Sisi has said that, “Israel knows that the lack of presence 
of the Egyptian military in Sinai poses a danger to it even more than it does to Egypt.”76 
Normalizing relations with the USA has been supremely important to Sisi’s 
regime. While it reluctantly accepted the overthrow of Mubarak, the USA kept silent on 
the coup against Morsi, pretending that there was no coup because there was still a 
civilian government. 77  The big demonstrations against Morsi and the subsequent 
repression of the Muslim Brotherhood were shrugged off as acts of restoring democracy. 
Sisi’s government gained official recognition from the USA and Western powers when 
Sisi headed an Egyptian delegation to the United Nations. Before the UN General 
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Assembly Sisi spoke of building an alliance to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and al-
Sham (ISIS). Sisi’s regime appeared to have received discreet support for his “roadmap” 
for ridding Egypt of “terrorism”. At the UN General Assembly, Sisi referred to Egypt’s 
experience with terrorism since the 1920s (with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in 1928) and the alleged “bloody sectarianism” to which the Muslim Brotherhood and 
their allies were driving the country.78 Exploiting the rise of ISIS and being well aware 
of the US need of the participation of the regional states in a military alliance against 
ISIS, Sisi pledged support for the US war against the Islamic State. At the same time, 
he called on President Obama to expand his campaign against extremism well beyond 
Iraq and Syria.  
Behind such maneuvers, Egypt’s has tried to get closer to Russia in hopes of 
obtaining arms and wheat from Russia, itself under Western sanctions, in need of non-
European markets elsewhere and strongly supportive of Sisi’s “war on terror”.79 Egypt’s 
overture to Russia seeks to impress upon USA and the Western powers that flexibility 
rather than pressure would be more effective in managing their relations with Sisi’s 
regime. This was evident when Sisi met Obama to discuss the establishment of security 
and political coordination between the USA and Egypt. In welcoming Sisi to the USA for 
“our first opportunity face-to-face to discuss a wide range of issues -- everything from the 
Palestinian-Israeli situation in Gaza, to Libya, to the issues of ISIS, Iraq and Syria”80, 
Obama described Egypt as “an important cornerstone of our security policy and our 
policy in the Middle East for a very long time.” 
The Egyptian regime knew that the USA would not pressure Egypt because 
ultimately they need Egypt in the region. Egypt’s ruling elites are sure that the US 
military aid will not be cut because the core USA-Egypt relationship is a military one.81 
They also regard the $1.3 billion dollar military aid as a US investment crucial to US 
geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Both sides accept that unless the military 
retains power, Egypt would be unstable and could descend into a civil war as in Libya 
and Syria – a position that conveniently sanctions domestic repression, authoritarianism 
and human rights abuses.  
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Conclusion 
In Egypt and the Arab world more broadly, foreign policy is the policy of the 
ruling elite because “state” and “regime” are effectively conflated with the ruling elite. In 
a sense, the foreign policy of Egypt does not reflect its political and geostrategic weight 
in the region. Far from leading any regional alliance, Egypt has accepted a subordinate 
position within existing regional networks. Since the Arab Spring, four regional alliances 
have emerged – Saudi Arabia and its allies; Qatar-Turkey and their allies, Iran and its 
allies, and the Salafi Jihadists such ISIS and Al-Qaeda and their alliances. The Saudi 
and Iranian groupings, two strong oil powers in the Muslim world, are strongest and 
they compete for dominance in the region.  
In contrast, post-2011 Egypt could no longer lead any initiative towards regional 
stabilization, which was the cornerstone of Egypt’s foreign policy under Sadat and 
Mubarak. After the 2011 uprising and the subsequent turmoil, Egypt remains a crucial 
supporter of US regional interests, offering the US flyover rights, counter terrorism 
intelligence, and unrivalled access to the Suez Canal. After the coup of 2013, Sisi’s 
regime has tried to show that stability has returned to the country. But, faced with a 
security challenge from home-gown militant groups, the Islamic State group’s affiliate 
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, the same socioeconomic crises that led to Mubarak’s ouster, and 
aware of the importance of the economy to stability the regime has tried hard to 
revitalize the national economy by opening it to Egyptian and foreign investors and 
bringing tourists back to the country. Yet Egypt’s economic crisis has deepened its 
dependence on external powers and increased its vulnerability by being integrated with 
the interests of the Gulf monarchies, Israel and the West.  
Sisi wants to consolidate his rule without political inclusion and meaningful 
opposition. He has used the absence of an elected parliament to unilaterally issue a 
series of decrees that severely restrict the freedoms of expression, association and 
assembly.82 However, escalating the repression of domestic opposition could test US-
Egypt relations, not out of moral principles but because excessive repression could fuel 
radicalization and instability which discourage foreign aid and investment. For the time 
being, Sisi has tried to hedge his bets by promoting closer ties with Russia and China 
such as the formation of the Egyptian Chinese Business Council83 and relying on Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE for financial and political support.  
Moreover, Sisi’s reliance on regional alignments that may swiftly change makes 
his regime’s survival dependent on the stability and survival of the Gulf regimes. Since 
the Arab Spring, many states of the region, as Yazid Sayigh correctly notes, face many 
kinds of challenges, including unsettled border legitimacy, unstable domestic power 
structures, cross-border threats, long-term socioeconomic transformation, and shifting 
                                                     
82 “2014: The Sisification of Egypt,” Daily News Egypt, December 30, 2014: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/ 
2014/12/30/2014-sisification-egypt/ 
83 “Egypt-China business council to launch investments in Egypt worth $250mn,” Egypt 
Independent, December 17, 2014, available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-
china-business-council-launch-investments-egypt-worth-250mn 
 Regime Survival Strategies and the Conduct of Foreign Policy in Egypt 
   
64 
 
IDE ME Review Vol.2 
©IDE-JETRO 2015 
regional alignments. 84  Although located in the center of the Middle East, Egypt is 
becoming “semi-isolated” where “proximate powers such as Libya, Qatar, Sudan, Hamas 
– and, in the wider region, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia – are not allies.”85 
Deepening economic dependency means that a major function of foreign policy 
must be to secure resource flows from external powers. That makes Egypt more 
responsive to external demands than to domestic opinion and endangers its national 
interests. Further dependence on the Gulf States, the USA and Israel would most likely 
erode popular support for Sisi as his rule is likened to that of Mubarak’s, perhaps worse 
as thousands have been killed and arbitrarily arrested. Since Sadat’s time, it has been a 
steady decline for Egypt’s regional strength. Between the 1979 peace treaty with Israel 
and the present reliance on the Gulf States, Egypt has less and less scope to maneuver 
regionally and internationally. It would be ironic if by being closely tied to US interests 
and influence, Egypt’s role shrinks further as American influence started to diminish 
after the Arab Spring.  
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